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Abstract. Social medias are increasing their influence with the vast public infor-
mation leading to their active use for marketing by the companies and organiza-
tions. Such marketing promotions are difficult to identify unlike the traditional 
medias like TV and newspaper. So, it is very much important to identify the pro-
moters in the social media. Although, there are active ongoing researches, exist-
ing approaches are far from solving the problem. To identify such imposters, it 
is very much important to understand their strategies of social circle creation and 
dynamics of content posting. Are there any specific spammer types? How suc-
cessful are each types? We analyze these questions in the light of social relation-
ships in Twitter. Our analyses discover two types of spammers and their relation-
ships with the dynamics of content posts. Our results discover novel dynamics of 
spamming which are intuitive and arguable. We propose ENWalk, a framework 
to detect the spammers by learning the feature representations of the users in the 
social media. We learn the feature representations using the random walks biased 
on the spam dynamics. Experimental results on large-scale twitter network and 
the corresponding tweets show the effectiveness of our approach that outper-
forms the existing approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
Social medias are increasing their influence tremendously. Twitter is one of the pop-
ular platforms where people post information in the form of tweets and share the tweets. 
Twitter is available from wide range of web-enabled services to all the people. So, the 
real time reflection of a society can be viewed in twitter. Celebrities, governments, pol-
iticians, businesses are active in twitter to provide their updates and to listen to the 
views of the people. Thus, the bidirectional flow of information is high. The openness 
of the online platforms and reliance on users facilitates the spammers to easily penetrate 
the platform and overwhelm the users with malicious intent and content. This work 
attempts to detect the spammers in social network using a case study of twitter. 
Spammers in social networks constantly adapt to avoid the detection. Moreover, they 
follow reflexive reciprocity [6, 17] (users following back when they are followed by 
someone to show courtesy) to establish social influence and act normal. So, it is be-
coming difficult for traditional spam detection methods to detect the spammers. Such 
spammers have widespread impacts. There are several reports of army of fake Twitter 
accounts1 being used to troll2  and promote political agendas3. Even US President Don-
ald Trump has been accused of fake followers4.  
In this paper, we present ENWalk, a framework that uses the content information to 
bias a random walk of the network and obtain the latent feature embedding of the nodes 
in the network. ENWalk generates the biased random walks and uses them to maximize 
the likelihood of obtaining similar nodes in the neighborhood of the network. We study 
the twitter content dynamics that could be important to bias those random walks. We 
found that there are two types of spammers: follow-flood and vigilant. We found that 
success rate, activity window, fraudulence and mentioning behaviors can be used to 
compare the equivalence of users in the twitter. We calculate the network equivalence 
using these four behavioral features between pairs of nodes and try to bias the random 
walks with interaction proximity of the pair of nodes. Experimental results on 17 mil-
lion user network from twitter show that the combination of behavioral features with 
the underlying network structure significantly outperform the existing state-of-the-art 
approaches for deception detection. 
2 Related Work 
There have been several works on spam detection in general, especially review spam 
[7], and opinion spam. However, in Twitter there are limited attempts. One of the ear-
liest works was done by Benevenuto et al. [1]. They manually labeled and trained a 
traditional classifier using the features extracted from user contents and behaviors. Lee 
et al. leveraged profile-based features and deployed social honeypots to detect new so-
cial spammers [9]. Stringhini et al. also studied spam detection using honey profiles 
[14]. Ghosh et al. studied the problem of link farming in Twitter [4] and introduced a 
ranking methodology to penalize the link farmers. Abuse of online social networks was 
studied in [16]. Campaign spams was studied on [3, 10, 19]. 
Skip-gram model [12] has been popular to learn the features from a large corpus of 
data. It inspired to establish an analogy for networks by representing a network as a 
“document”. Similar to document being an ordered sequence of words, we can create 
an ordered sequence of nodes from a network using sampling techniques. DeepWalk 
[13] learns d-dimensional feature representations by simulating uniform random walks. 
LINE [15] learns the d-dimensional features into two phases: d/2 BFS-style simulations 
and another d/2 2-hop distant nodes. Node2vec [5] creates the ordered sequence simu-
lating the BFS and DFS approaches. All these feature learning approaches don’t use the 
data associated with node which are important to learn the behaviors of the nodes. 
                                                          
1  http://theatln.tc/2m8g3eA 
2  http://bzfd.it/2m8rlja 
3  http://bit.ly/2kJiMKu 
4  http://bit.ly/1ViorHd, http://53eig.ht/2kzrhfL 
3 Dataset 
For this work, we use the Twitter dataset used in [18]. It contains 17 million users hav-
ing 467 million Twitter posts covering a seven month period from June 1 2009 to De-
cember 31 2009. To extract the network graph for those 17 million users, we extracted 
the follower-following topology of Twitter from [8] which contains all the entire twitter 
user profiles and their social relationships till July 2009. We pruned the users so that 
they have social relationship in [8] and tweets in [18] and are left with 4,405,698 users. 
Twitter suspends the accounts involved in the malicious activity (https://support.twit-
ter.com/articles/18311). To obtain the suspend status of accounts, we re-crawled the 
profile pages of all the 17 million users. This yielded a total of 100,758 accounts that 
had been suspended (the profile page redirects to the page https://twitter.com/ac-
count/suspended). We use this suspension signal as the primary signal for evaluating 
our models as the primary reason for account suspension is the involvement in the spam 
activity. However, there might be other reasons like inactivity. So, to ensure the sus-
pended accounts are spammers, we further checked for malicious activities for those 
users. For this, we examined various URLs from the account’s timeline and checked 
them against a list of blacklisted URLs. We use three blacklists: Google Safebrowsing 
(http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/), URIBL (http://uribl.com/) and Joewein 
(http://www.joewein.net/). We found that 75% of suspended accounts posted at least 
one shortened URL blacklisted. We also looked for duplicate tweets enforced for pro-
motion. After applying these additional criteria, our final data comprised of 86,652 
spammers and 4,319,046 non-spammers, which was used for evaluating our model. 
4 Spam Analysis 
Characterizing the dominant spammer types is important as it is the first step in under-
standing the dynamics of spamming. We studied the follower-following network crea-
tion strategies of the spammers. We found that there are two main types of spamming 
based on the follow-following strategies: (1) follow-flood spammers and (2) vigilant 
spammers. So, the question arises why some spammers are more successful? In this 
section, we study the behavioral aspects of tweet dynamics of spammers. We later lev-
erage them in model building.  
4.1 Spammer Type 
To analyze the strategies of follower-following, we calculated the number of followers 
(users that are following the current user) and the number of followings (users that the 
current user is following) for each spammer. Figure 1 shows the plot in log scale count. 
It shows that the follower and following count differ for each spammers. The users with 
more followers than followings tend to be more successful as they have been able to 
“earn” a lot of users who are following them. So, we define success rate as: 
𝑠𝑟𝑢 = # of followers of 𝑢# of followings of 𝑢                                (1) 
Based on the network expansion success rate, we find that there are two dominant spam-
ming strategies: 
 Follow-flood Spammers: These are less 
successful spammers who just flood the net-
work with friendship initiation so as to get 
followers who they can influence. We cate-
gorize the spammers with success rate (𝑠𝑟𝑢) less than 1 in this type.  
 Vigilant Spammers: These are successful 
spammers who take a cautious approach of 
friendship creation and content posting. 
Spammers with success rate (𝑠𝑟𝑢) greater or equal to 1 are categorized as vigilant. 
To learn the dynamics of each spammer 
type, we further analyzed the success rate of 
spammers with other behavioral aspects – 
activity window, usage of promotion words 
or blacklist words and hashtag mentioning.  
4.2 Activity Window 
We compute the activity window as the number of days a user is active in the twitter 
network. Since, we don’t have the exact time when a user was suspended, we approxi-
mate the time of suspension as the date of the last tweet tweeted by the user. We found 
that the average activity window of a vigilant spammer is 138 days with a standard 
deviation of 19 days compared to the average of 35 days and standard deviation of 12 
days for follow-flood spammers. Although, the basic strategy of any spammer is to in-
ject itself into the network and emit the spam contents, the success rate also depends 
how long it can remain undetected in the network. So, vigilant spammers have a higher 
success rate. 
4.3 Fraudulence 
One of the primary reason to spam is to inject constant fraudulence information. So, we 
analyzed the fraudulence behavior of the two types of spammers. We labeled the tweets 
containing promotional, adult words or the blacklisted urls as fraud tweets. So, we com-
pute fraudulence as: 
𝑓𝑟𝑢 = # of fraud tweets of 𝑢total # of tweets of 𝑢                             (2) 
We found that the average fraudulence of vigilant spammers is 0.34 compared to 0.86 
of follow-flood spammers. So, the follow-flood spammers are more involved in spam. 
4.4 Mentioning Celebrities and Popular Hashtags 
Mentioning the popular celebrities or hashtags empowers a tweet. So, one of the com-
mon strategies of spammers is to include the popular ones in their tweets.  We studied 
mentioning phenomenon and found that vigilant spammers mention half the celebrities 
per tweets compared to the follow-flood spammers.  
 Figure 1. Follower-Following Count of 
Spammers. Each Blue dot represents a 
spammer and the red line is the plot of y=x 
line. 
5 Learning Latent Features for Spam Detection 
Having characterized the dynamics of spamming in Twitter, can we improve spam de-
tection beyond the existing state-of-the-art approaches? To answer this we used our 
Twitter data to setup a latent feature learning problem in networks. Our analysis is gen-
eral and can be used to any social network. 
5.1 Overview 
As discussed in the previous section, the dynamics of Twitter are interesting and can 
be leveraged to catch the spammers. So, we use the spam dynamics to formulate the 
latent feature learning in social networks. Let 𝐺 = (𝑉 , 𝐸,𝑋) be a given network with 
vertices, edges and the social network data of users in the social network. We aim to 
learn a mapping function 𝑓 ∶ 𝑉  → ℝ𝑑 from nodes to a d-dimensional feature represen-
tations which can be used for prediction. The parameter ݀ specifies the number of di-
mensions of the latent features such that the size of 𝑓  is |𝑉 | × 𝑑. 
We present a novel sampling strategy that samples nodes in network exploiting the 
spam dynamics such that the equivalent neighborhood 𝐸𝑁(𝑢) ⊂ 𝑉  contains the node 
having similar tweeting behaviors with the node 𝑢. We generate 𝐸𝑁(𝑢) for each nodes 
in the network and predict which nodes are the members of 𝑢’s equivalent neighbors 
based on the learnt latent features 𝑓 . The basic rationale is that we wish to learn latent 
feature representations for nodes that respect equivalent neighborhoods (which are 
based on the spamming dynamics) so that classification/ranking using the learned rep-
resentation yields results that leverage the spamming dynamics. 
5.2 The Optimization Problem 
As our goal is to learn the latent features 𝑓  that best describe the equivalent neighbor-
hood 𝐸𝑁(𝑢) of node 𝑢, we define the optimization problem as follows: 
  ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃 𝑟(𝐸𝑁(𝑢)∣𝑓(𝑢))
𝑢 ∈𝑉𝑓 
𝑚𝑎𝑥                             (3) 
To solve the optimization problem, we extend the SkipGram architecture [5, 13, 15] 
which approximates the conditional probability using an independence assumption that 
the likelihood of observing an equivalent neighborhood node is independent of observ-
ing any other equivalent neighborhood given the latent features of the source node. 
𝑃 𝑟(𝐸𝑁(𝑢)∣𝑓(𝑢)) = ∏ Pr (𝑣|𝑓(𝑢)
𝑣 ∈𝐸𝑁(𝑢)
                       (4) 
Since, the source node and the equivalent neighborhood node have symmetric equiv-
alence, the conditional likelihood can be modeled as softmax unit parameterized by a 
dot product of their features. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑣∣𝑓(𝑢)) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝( 𝑓(𝑣). 𝑓(𝑢))∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑓(𝑡). 𝑓(𝑢))𝑡∈𝑉                         (5) 
The optimization problem now becomes: 
  ∑ [−𝑙𝑜𝑔  𝑍𝑢 + ∑ 𝑓(𝑡). 𝑓(𝑢)𝑡 ∈𝐸𝑁(𝑢)  ]𝑢 ∈𝑉𝑓 
𝑚𝑎𝑥                  (6) 
For large networks, the partition function 𝑍𝑢 = ∑ exp (𝑓(𝑡). 𝑓(𝑢))𝑡∈𝑉  is expensive 
to compute. So, we use negative sampling [12] to approximate it. We use stochastic 
gradient descent over the model parameters defining the features 𝑓 . Feature learning 
methods based on Skip-gram architecture are developed for natural language [11]. 
Since natural language texts are linear, the notion of a neighborhood can be naturally 
defined using a sliding window over consecutive words in sentences. Networks are not 
linear, and thus a richer notion of a neighborhood is needed. To mitigate this problem, 
we use multiple biased random walks each one in principle exploring a different neigh-
borhood [5]. 
5.3 Equivalent Neighborhood Generation 
The analyses of spam dynamics leads to an important inference that the nodes are sim-
ilar if they have similar spam dynamics. So, we want to exploit those dynamics to gen-
erate the equivalent neighborhood 𝐸𝑁(𝑢) for the node 𝑢. Nodes in a network are 
equivalent if they share similar behaviors. We use the random walk procedure which 
can be biased to generate the equivalent neighborhood.  
We bias the random walks based on the four dynamics: common time of activ-
ity (𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣), success rate difference (𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑣), fraudulence commonalities (𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑣) and com-mon mentioning in tweets (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑣). We calculate each dynamics as follows: 
𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣 = # of days with common activity# of days either 𝑡 or 𝑣 is active                       (7) 
𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑣 = 1 − ∣max (1, # of followers of 𝑡# of followings of 𝑡) − max (1, # of followers of 𝑣# of followings of 𝑣)∣ (8) 
𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑣 = 1 − ∣# of fraud tweets of 𝑡# of tweets of 𝑡 − # of fraud tweets  of 𝑣# of tweets of 𝑣 ∣        (9) 
𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑣 = common mentions between 𝑡 and 𝑣total mentions of 𝑡 and 𝑣                 (10) 
For all the above four features, a higher value represents a closer connection between 
the pair of nodes. For a source node 𝑢, we generate a random walk of fixed length 𝑘. 
The 𝑖𝑡ℎ node 𝑐𝑖 of a random walk starting at node 𝑐0 is generated with the distribution: 
	  𝑃(c𝑖 = 𝑡 | c𝑖−1 = 𝑣) = {ℬ𝑣𝑡, 𝑖𝑓(𝑣, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐸0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                      (11) 
where ℬ𝑣𝑡 is the normalized transition probability between nodes 𝑣 and 𝑡. The tran-sition probability are computed based on the spam dynamics so that the source node 
has equivalent spam dynamics with its neighborhood nodes. 
We define four parameters which guide the random walk. Consider that a random 
walk just traversed edge (𝑡, 𝑣) to now reside at node 𝑣. The walk now needs to decide 
on the next step so it evaluates the transition probabilities on edges (𝑣, 𝑥) leading 
from 𝑣. We set the transition probability to ℬ𝑣𝑥 = 𝛼𝑝𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑡, 𝑣, 𝑥).𝑤𝑣𝑥, where 
𝛼𝑝𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑡, 𝑣, 𝑥) = 𝑝. (𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣 + 𝑐𝑡𝑣𝑥) + 𝑞. (𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑣 + 𝑠𝑟𝑣𝑥) + 𝑟. (𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑣 + 𝑓𝑟𝑣𝑥) + 𝑠. (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑣 + 𝑚𝑒𝑣𝑥)        (12) 
where the parameters 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟 , 𝑠 are used to prioritize the tweet dynamics. To select the 
next node, the random walk is biased towards the nodes which have similar tweet dy-
namics to both the current node and the previous node in the random walk. 
5.4 Algorithm: ENWalk 
Algorithm 1 details our entire scheme. We start with 𝜆 fixed length random walks at 
each node 𝑙		times. To obtain each walk, we use GetEquivalentNeighbor, the random sam-
pler that samples the node based on the transition probabilities computed in equation 
12. It is worth noting that the tweet dynamics between the nodes (𝐶𝑇 ,𝑆𝑅, 𝐹𝑅, 𝑀𝐸) 
defined in equation 7, 8, 9, 10 respectively can be pre-computed. Once, we have random 
walks we can obtain 𝑑 dimensional numeric features using the optimization function in 
equation 6 with a window size of 𝑘. The three phases preprocessing, random sampling 
and optimization are asynchronous so that ENWalk is scalable. 
6 Experiment 
We applied ENWalk to twitter dataset to evaluate its effectiveness.  In this section, we 
discuss the baseline methods and compare with ENWalk for classification and ranking. 
6.1 Baseline Methods 
For classification, we compare our model with two graph embedding methods: Deep-
walk and node2vec. We use PageRank and Markov Random Field (MRF) approaches 
 
Algorithm 1: ENWalk ሺ𝐺, 𝑑, 𝜆, 𝑙, 𝑘, [𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑠]ሻ 
Input: graph  𝐺(𝑉 , 𝐸,𝑊,𝑋) 
embedding dimensions  𝒅 
walks per node  𝜆 
walk length  𝑙 
context size  𝑘 
tweet parameters  𝒑, 𝒒, 𝒓, 𝒔 
Output: matrix of latent features  𝑭  
1. (࡯ࢀ, ࡿࡾ, ࡲࡾ,ࡹࡱ) = Preprocessሺ𝑮,𝒑, 𝒒, 𝒓, 𝒔) 
2. Initialize 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒔 to empty 
3. for 𝑖 = 𝟏  to  𝝀  do 
4.        for each 𝑣𝑖 𝜺 𝑽  do 
5.               Initialize 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌  to 𝑣𝑖   
6.               for  𝑗 = 𝟏  to  𝒍  do  
7.                       𝒙  = GetEquivalentNeighbor(𝐺,𝐶𝑇 , 𝑆𝑅,𝐹𝑅, 𝑀𝐸, 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘[𝑗], 𝑊 ) 
8.                      Append 𝒙  to 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌 
9.               Append 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌 to 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒔 
10. 𝑭 		= StochasticGradientDescentሺ𝒌 , 𝒅 , 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒔ሻ 
for ranking of spam nodes. We did not use feature ex-
traction techniques like [1] as they only use the node 
features without using the graph structure. 
Deepwalk [13]. It is the first approach to integrate the 
language modeling for network feature representation. 
It generates uniform random walks equivalent to sen-
tences in the language model.  
Node2vec [13]. It is another representation learning for 
nodes in the network. It extends the language model of random walks employing a 
flexible notion of neighborhood. It designs a biased random walk using BFS and DFS 
neighborhood discovery.  
PageRank Models. PageRank is a popular ranking algorithm that exploits the link-
based structure of a network graph to rank the nodes of the graph. 
𝑃𝑅 = (1 − α) ∗ 𝑀 ∗ 𝑃𝑅 + α ∗ 𝑝                                 (13) 
where 𝑀  is transition probability matrix, 𝑝  represents the prior probability with 
which a random surfer surfs to a random page and 𝛼 is damping factor. For variations 
of PageRank, we vary the values of 𝑀  and 𝑝 using trustworthiness of a user. Trustwor-
thiness (𝑓𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡) is using a set of features (# of Blacklist URL, # of tweets, # of mentions, # of duplicate tweets, # of tweets containing adult/bad words, # of tweets containing 
violent words, # of tweets containing promotional words and the total time of activity 
for the user). We manually labeled 𝑓𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡score of 800 users (400 non-suspended and 400 suspended). We gave a real-valued trustworthiness score between 0 and 1. A value 
closer to 0 means the user is most likely a spammer. We then obtain the weight of the 
features by learning linear regression model on the users. 
 Traditional PageRank We use the default PageRank settings for 𝑀and 𝑝.  
 Trust Induced and Trust Prior: Transition matrix 𝑀  is modified as 𝑀𝑢𝑣 = M𝑢𝑣 ∗𝑓𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡(𝑣), ∀𝑢, ∀𝑣 and 𝑓𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡(𝑣) is used as prior probability. 
Markov Random Field Models. Markov Random Fields are undirected graphs (and 
can be cyclic) that satisfy the three conditional independence properties (Pairwise, Lo-
cal, and Global). For the inference, we use the Loopy Belief Propagation algorithm. 
Inspired by spam detection in [2], we define 3 hidden states {Spammer, Mixed, Non-
Spammer} and the Propagation Matrix is used as in Table 1. Logically, spammers fol-
low other spammers more (hence 0.8 probability) and non-spammers tend to follow 
other non- spammers. We also include the mixed state to include those users who are 
difficult to categorize spammers or non-spammers. 
6.2  Node Classification 
We obtained the feature representations from three different algorithms: ENWalk, 
node2vec and DeepWalk using the settings used in node2vec and DeepWalk. All the 
feature learnings are unsupervised. Similar to node2vec and DeepWalk, we used 𝑑 =128, 𝜆 = 10, 𝑙 = 80, 𝑘 = 10.  We found that the parameters 𝑑, 𝜆, 𝑙, 𝑘	are sensitive in 
a similar style to node2vec and DeepWalk. We used each feature representation as an 
example for standard SVM classifier. We used 10-fold cross-validation using balanced 
Table 1. Propagation Matrix 
for (S)pammer,  (M)ixed, 
(N)on-Spammer 
 S M N 
S 0.80 0.40 0.025 
M 0.15 0.50 0.125 
N 0.05 0.10 0.850 
data obtained from sub-sampling of the nega-
tive class. From the classification results in 
Table 2, ENWalk performs better. It has 
higher precision, recall, F1-score and accu-
racy due to the biased random walks. 
6.3 Node Ranking 
We use two metrics to evaluate the ranking re-
sults: Cumulative Distribution Function of 
Suspended Users and Precision@n. We rank 
all the nodes in the graph and provide a node 
rank percentile. For each node rank percentile, 
we compute the number of suspended users in 
that percentile. We plot the cumulative distri-
bution function for those suspended users. We 
also calculate the Area Under Curve (AUC) 
for the CDF. The higher the area the better the 
model. Precision@n of Suspended Users 
evaluates how many top n nodes suggested by 
a model are actually the suspended users. This 
is effective to screen the nodes that are probable being spammers. 
To evaluate the ranking performance of ENWalk, we use Logistic Regression on the 
features obtained from the model.  We compare our model with PageRank and Markov 
Random Field models. We present the CDF in Fig 2. We can see that ENWalk outper-
forms all the baseline models. We also computed the AUC and precision@100 (Table 
3). A higher AUC and precision@100 signifies the ability to profile the top spammers. 
7 Conclusion 
We studied the problem of identifying spammers in Twitter who are involved in mali-
cious attacks. This is very much important as it has many practical applications in to-
day’s world where almost everyone is actively social online. This paper proposed a 
method of spam detection in Twitter that makes use of the online network structure and 
information shared. This data driven approach is important as there is a lot of data of 
social medias online these days. We demonstrated the helpfulness of biased random 
walks in learning node embedding that can be used for classification and ranking tasks. 
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 Figure 2. Cumulative Distribution 
Function of Suspended Nodes 
Table 3. Ranking Results: Area Under 
CDF Curve (AUC) and Preci-
sion@100(P@100) 
Model AUC P@100 
PR-T 0.4059 0.02 
PR-TITP 0.4181 0.03 
MRF 0.4944 0.02
DeepWalk 0.5502 0.05 
node2vec 0.5836 0.05 
ENWalk 0.6335 0.12 
Table 2. Classification Results: Precision (P), 
Recall (R), F1-score (F) and Accuracy (A) 
Model P R F A 
DeepWalk 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.51 
Node2vec 0.46 0.53 0.49 0.57 
ENWalk 0.59 0.66 0.62 0.71 
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